At 1706 hours on 18 August 1999 the Indian Pacific passenger train No. 3AP88, Adelaide to Perth, was inadvertently directed onto the loop line at Zanthus where a freight train, No. 3PW4N, Perth to Whyalla was standing and as a consequence a low speed collision occurred between the two trains. The collision resulted in seventeen passengers and four train crew members being conveyed to Kalgoorlie Hospital by the Royal Flying Doctor, luggage/smoking lounge car HM311, on the Indian Pacific passenger train derailing and sustaining extensive damage and significant damage sustained to locomotives NR51, NR15 and passenger coaches. The east west rail link at Zanthus was closed to train operations until 1305 hours on August 19, 1999. At the time of the collision, there were one hundred and eighty one (181) passengers, sixteen (16) Great Southern Railway On Train staff and five (5) Train Crew (drivers) on the two (2) trains. Thirty one (31) passengers and fourteen (14) On Train staff have reported sustaining some injury or side effects. Of the twenty one (21) persons conveyed to Kalgoorlie Hospital by the Royal Flying Doctor, only two (2) were held in hospital overnight for observation. One remained in hospital subsequently for some weeks. There was no damage incurred to track and infrastructure. The Indian Pacific Passenger train 3AP88 is owned and operated by Great Southern Railway using locomotives and locomotive crews provided on a “Hook and Pull” contract with National Rail Corporation. Freight service 3PW4N is operated by National Rail Corporation. Australian Rail Track Corporation owns the track section and provides Train Control management from the Adelaide Control Centre. The train management safeworking system in operation over the section of line is a Train Order System. Mainline to loop points are fitted with electric points motors, equipped with mechanical point indicators and coloured light indicators, which are activated locally by push button switches provided in a control box at the equipment room. The investigation found that the collision resulted from a crew member of train 3PW4N operating a push button control, as 3AP88 approached the points, altering the setting of the main line points from normal to reverse diverting train 3AP88 on to the loop. There was no mechanical or electrical interlocking system to prevent the movement of the points in front of the approaching train. Procedural measures have been instituted to prevent a similar occurrence in the short term pending completion of a system upgrade being undertaken by Australian Rail Track Corporation. The system upgrade will provide a time interlock designed to prevent the movement of the points for a precise period related to the stopping time for an approaching train. The upgrade programme has commenced and is expected to be completed by December 1999.