This report predominantly deals with the risk of an incident to arise in a road tunnel and the possible extent of the ensuing consequences. The road tunnel is statistically the safest part of the road network and there have been very few serious accidents compared to the remaining network. Nevertheless, it is of vital importance that technical aspects and organizational routines are maintained at a level corresponding to the designed safety of the tunnel. The recent major fires in European tunnels have put tunnel safety in the media spotlight in quite a different way than what we have been used to. Most frequently, it is fire safety that is under scrutiny. Catastrophic tunnel fire scenarios are being used more and more to describe the loading/accidents we must protest the public against, even if such scenarios very rare occurrences. The consequences of implementing such protectioe measure are in general enormous. However, it is important to put these possible disasters in a realistic perspective and to focus on how such incidents may start in the first place and on how to prevent them from escalating into catastrophes. Geometric design, technical equipment, choice of materials for water and frost protection, etc. are important factors for such containment. Self rescue has become an internationally accepted primary safety principle for road tunnels. In fast the same principle applies for all constructions where people may be present: design and normal maintenance of a structure must ensure that people have appropriate and sufficient time to evacuate safely or save themselves after an incidence has occurred. This report has two main focus areas: - accidents in the tunnel entrance zone and - fire safety of water/frost protection. Statistical analysis of accidents in tunnels reveals the tunnel entrance zone as having the highest accident rate. The reasons for this are several and are in many cases site/tunnel specific. Choice of material, geometric design and lighting techniques/conditions together with maintenance routines are central issues in this area. Fire protection of combustible water/frost protection material is given considerable attention in the report. This problem is distinctively Nordic due to the extensive use in the Nordic countries of polyethylene foam as an isolation material for water/frost protection. This practice of knowingly using a combustible material in a tunnel will always cause safety considerations to focus on associated methods of protection and fire scenarios, leaving little time or effort for other safety measures. However, the use of this combustible material should only be viewed as a stage in the process towards fire resistant tunnel structures. The future work of the Committee should focus on making this next step.