A new approach to the design of concession contracts of port infrastructures that adapts some of the methods used in the design and start-up of strategic alliances is presented. From a cost-benefit analysis of the project, based on the industry benchmarks, a revenue-sharing model dependent on the investment interest and the risk undertaken or transferred by each partner was formulated. This model aids in the calculation of the amount of the canons (lease and royalty charges) that should be stated in the contract. Also, to avoid complicated renegotiations and undesired deadlock situations, methods are presented for the dynamic actualization of such canons according to changes that might occur during the concession life. Finally, in those situations in which, for welfare policy reasons, the public partner wants to minimize the risk of a failure of the concession, dynamic mechanisms have been developed that allow the public authority to offer the private partner partial insurance against losses based on a recovery mechanism of the subsidized amounts.